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The Family Franchise: Elderly Parents
and Adult Siblings
Margaret F. Brinig"
Weakened is not enough. Destroyed isn't enough.
He's got to repent and feel humiliation and regret.
I won't be satisfied until he knows what he is.'
Beach picnic or hayrack ride,
Fishing stories told with pride,
Told and retold around the fire,
White the hot flames mounted higher.
Great grandchildren love you now,
Is it any wonder how,
Each year with glee this sign they greet,
"Grasse Cottage-Merrymeet."2
I. INTRODUCTION
I would like to begin with two stories about families and places
over time. Both are modern, but one is fictional (from Jane Smiley's
A Thousand Acres)3 while the other is real (from the Duluth News-
Tribune).4
In the first, the story begins with a widower who owns a very
large family farm in Iowa. He wishes to retire and to give the farm
to his three married daughters.' Two of the daughters reside in
* Professor of Law, George Mason University. I owe thanks to colleagues F.H.
Buckley, Lloyd Cohen, Claire Hill, and Francesco Parisi; the participants in the
University of Utah College of Law Family Law Symposium; Professor Stephen Van
Evera of the political science department at MIT; and Professor Carl E. Schneider. I
thank students Tracy Brandt- and Emily Frye for their able assistance.
1. JANE SMILEY, A THOUSAND ACRES 216 (First Ballantine Books 1992) (1991).
Rose, the oldest of three sisters, is speaking of her elderly father.
2. Elizabeth G.N. Earls, untitled poem from 1936, in The Annals of Merrymeet
(unpublished family diary), reprinted with permission in Mark Stodghill, Cottage
Sparks Fond Childhood Memories, DULUTH NEWS-TRIBUNE (Minn), July 29, 1995, at
3. SMILEY, supra note 1
4. Stodghill, supra note 2.
5. Smiley's book somewhat parallels an older story. In KMng Lear, Shakespeare
tells us that the old king's strength is failing. He loves each of his three daughters
exceedingly, and although he loves the youngest more than the others, he strives to
be fair. He will divide his substantial kingdom in three shares, giving one-third to
393
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their own homes on the family property, working as farm wives;'
the third lives in Des Moines, practicing law.7 The two who have
remained nearby are at first happy when the lawyer sister refuses
her share.8 But after a while, things disintegrate to the point where
one of the farm wives concocts an elaborate scheme to kill the other
and the family ends up in courtO The struggle is about the farm
property, of course, but even more it concerns positions in the fami-
ly and how these positions change as the sisters and their father
age.'0 The embittered daughter, Rose, describes to her sister that
she wants her father destroyed. The sister, Ginny, thinks that it
"was incredible to me to hear Rose speak like this, but it was intoxi-
cating too, as sweet and forbidden as anything I had ever done. I
couldn't resist her. I said, 'Rosie, I understand. I'm with you. '""
In the second tale, a Scottish minister moves to the upper Mid-
west and purchases a home on Madeleine Island in Lake Superior.
One hundred years later, his progeny all converge on the place to
celebrate together.' They point out height marks placed years ago
each. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR act 1, sc. 1, Ins. 36-45 (John D. Wilson ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1984). This, however, is only the presumptive amount, for he
gives each daughter an opportunity to demonstrate why she should be given more
than a one-third share. You will remember, the first, Regan, says at some length
that she loves him more than life itself. Id. at Ins. 55-61. The second, Goneril, says
she loves him as much or more than Regan does-more than anything else in the
world. Id at Ins. 69-76. As the youngest, Cordelia, points out, Goneril loves Lear
more than her intended husband. Id- at hns. 99-106. Cordelia refuses to engage in
this game of flattery. She points out that she knows how much her father loves her
and that she loves him that much in return, exactly as a daughter ought. Id. at Ins.
87-104; see also Flora A. Steele, Caporushes, in ENGLISH FAIRY TALES 280 (1918)
(retelling fairy tale of man with three daughters who questions their love for him).
Of course, the rest of the tragedy involves the competition for greater shares that
takes place between the two oldest, Regan and Goneril. Lear fails to see the truth in
what his favorite child has told him and succumbs to the flattery of the others. The
play is complicated by a parallel dispute between the illegitimate and legitimate sons
of the Duke of Gloucester, showing, among other things, that this problem is not
confined to female offspring. See also SMILEY, supra note 1, at 120-28, where two
brothers at a neighboring farm engage in a parallel set of disputes.
6. SMILEY, supra note 1, at 6-13. The daughter Rose is portrayed as greedy
and intolerant, the narrator Ginny as indecisive, and Caroline as unwilling to take
responsibility for or be involved in providing care for their elderly and widowed fa-
ther. Id-
7. This is the youngest daughter, Caroline (the parallel to Shakespeare's
Cordelia), who moves away and gains distance from the family and the farm. Id- at
13-20.
8. Id- at 36-39. In King Lear, the two eldest children form the initial alliance.
SHAKESPEARE, supra note 5, at lns. 283-306.
9. SMILEY, supra note 1, at 311-14, 318.
10. See id at 315-26.
11. Id. at 216.
12. Stodghill, supra note 2, at 1A
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on an upstairs bedroom wall or a table at which they played as
children.' They remember all the special times: the joyful first
meetings and reunions of cousins spread all over the country. Most
of all, each relates the sense of peace and acceptance and place
associated with the old white clapboard house. "I have so many
happy memories throughout the years here," one great-grandchild
said. "It's a place you could come to and just sort of be yourself and
everybody always accepted you." '
Families persist despite legal changes and obstacles." My
point is that law can either ease the transitions families inevitably
make or it can make them substantially more difficult. When law
eases transitions, as in the second story, the offshoots are peace and
growth, because the parties rest in what economists would call an
equilibrium. When law makes transitions more difficult, as in the
first story, the results are moral-based regret and longing-a dis-
equilibrium.
In this paper, I am going to concentrate on one family transi-
tion where we have established substantial legal barriers-that of
emancipation. However, I will briefly allude to other "broken fami-
lies," such as the divorcing family and the family divided by adop-
tion.
As students of the family, we are preoccupied with divorce. We
write about families in crisis and use the fabric of their lives worn
thin and stretched to the breaking point to develop our ideas about
what families are and even what they ought to be. In a way, of
course, law teaching and the Socratic method drive us toward such
family autopsies. Happily, most of us live most of our lives in fami-
lies that are much healthier: We grow, we develop trust, and we
dare to share ourselves with the special people in our inner cir-
cle. 6 Much of the law that is in the broadest sense family
law-frequently the unexplored law-protects us and encourages us





15. Robert H. Mlnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the
Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 252-53 (1975).
16. For descriptions of the creation of intimacy, see MILTON C. REGAN, JL, FAM-
ILY LAW AND THE PuRSUIT OF INTIMACY passim (1993), and Jennifer R. Morse, The
Development of the Child, Address at the George Mason University Liberty Fund
Symposium on the Family, the Person and the State 62 (March 1995) (focusing
mainly on parent and child) (transcript on file with author).
17. See Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20
HOFSTRA L. REV. 495, 497-98 (1992).
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What I would like to do today is to launch my own exploration
into what family means in a peculiar context, one in which it seems
that there are few legal obligations but some of the strongest and
most important relationships in life. Today I want to focus for
awhile on what I call the family franchise-the relationships pres-
ent even after the strongest legal bonds are broken by emancipa-
tion, adoption, or divorce. Perhaps you share some of these situa-
tions as well. I first think about my elderly and increasingly idio-
syncratic parents. I have siblings with families of their own who
nonetheless taunt me with snatches of remembered intimacy. I
consider the father of my children, who-though we are no longer
legally husband and wife-daily teaches me about responsibility and
faithfulness. Finally, I dwell on my oldest child, whose birthday was
my happiest day, and who is now beginning her own independent
life in college. I know these are all people to whom I am somehow,
thankfully, forever closely bound. Despite such people's importance
in our lives, we do not spend much time in law school courses think-
ing about them, about how we as lawyers and lawmakers can
strengthen these relationships.
To tie these into more general observations, I hope to show how
this largely untraversed area of family law relates to the concerns
we have treated as more central in our courses-in particular, the
laws relating to provision for minor children and those relating to
marital property. On a still more global level, I wish to suggest that
the current preoccupation with "rights"8 forces us into a less-at-
tractive model; It need not be so.
Families are better together. Working together... The kind of
life people lead in this country is getting rarer and rarer. Three
generations on one farm, working together, is something to pro-
tect. 9
Merrymeet is the one place in my lifetime that hasn't
changed .... Everything else in life has changed so dramatically,
and this is a constant. This cottage is abs.olutely the same.'
Even though most of us have lost the family farm, and certain-
ly Lear's kingdom, we can still discover (or begin) family traditions
which are frequently centered around one place. Home places bring
us back from our diaspora to a shared family experience. However,
18. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDoN, RIGmI5 TALK: THE IMPOVERISHIENT OF P0-
L1TICAL DIscouRsE 121-30 (1991) (discussing "rights" related to various family law
issues).
19. SMILEY, supra note 1, at 266.
20. Stodghill, supra note 2, at 1A.
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for some there is no family place. When physical closeness, though
best, is impossible, modem communication developments such as
electronic mail can be a wonderful family unifier.2'
Before I begin modelling families, I want to describe briefly two
different ways that I (and others) have pictured families. In much of
my earlier theoretical work on families, I have argued that many of
a family's workings can be described in terms of two models: the
market or contract model' and the firm or covenant paradigm.'
The contract model is particularly useful in describing the law and
relationships that govern parties about to enter into family relation-
ships, for example, courtship, marriage, and adoption.24 To some
extent, contract may also be appropriate for framing the context of
dissolving families: those disrupted by separation, divorce,' or ter-
mination of parental rights." However, dragging contract law from
its usual commercial context into family law has serious drawbacks.
The most obvious drawback is that contract law is virtually useless
for treating love, trust, faithfulness, and sympathy, which more
than any other terms describe the essentials of family." The sec-
2L Joel Garreau, Thanksgiving in Cyberspaca A Far-Flung, Close-Knit Family's
Computer Network, WASH. PoST, Nov. 25, 1993, at BI (discussing closeness main-
tained by one large family through electronic mail).
22. See Margaret F. Brinig & Michael V. Alexeev, Fraud in Courtship: Annul-
ment and Divorce, 2 BUR. JL. & ECON. 45, 49-51 (1995); Margaret F. Brinig, The
Effect of Transactions Costs on the Market for Babies, 18 SEToN HALL LEGIS. J. 553,
553-60 (1994); Margaret F. Brinig & Steven M.L Crafton, Marriage and Opportunism,
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 869, 870-73 (1994); Margaret F. Brinig, Rings and Promises, 6
J.L,, EcoN. & ORGANIZATION 203, 204-13 (1990).
23. See MARGARET F. BRINIG, MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN: THE LAW AND Eco-
NOMTICS OF THE FAMILY 8 (forthcoming 1996) (on file with author); Margaret F.
Brinig, Status, Contract and Covenant, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1573, 1594-99 (1994)
(reviewing REGAN, supra note 16).
24. See Marjorie M. Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for
State Policy, 70 CAL. L. REV. 204, 231 (1982) (discussing prenuptial agreements).
25. See, e.g., Brinig & Crafton, supra note 22, at 892-94 (indicating no-fault
divorce precludes enforcement of marriage promises); Margaret F. Brinig & June
Carbone, The Reliance Interest in Marriage and Divorce, 62 TuLANE L. REV. 855,
894-905 (1988) (advocating fault as measure of which party should bear losses in
divorce); June Carbone, Economics, Feminism and the Reinvention of Alimony: A
Reply to Ira Ellman, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1463, 1463-68 (1990) (criticizing Ellman's
divorce theory and advocating a restitution theory); Arthur B. Cornell, Jr., When Two
Become One, and Then Come Undone: An Organizational Approach to Marriage and
Its Implications for Divorce Law, 26 FAM. L.Q. 103, 120-29 (1992) (using organiza-
tional rather than economic theories to describe divorce problems).
26. See Margaret F. Brinig, The Nature of the Contract Between Parent and
Child, Prepared for the George Mason University Liberty Fund Symposium on the
Family, the Person and the State 1-4 (Mar. 1995) (on file with author).
27. See, e.g., REGAN, supra note 16, at 1-5 (noting complexities of applying legal
standards to interpersonal rights); Brinig, Status, Contract and Covenant, supra note
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ond problem is that contract law implies the possibility of breach.
When a better deal comes along, it may be more appropriate to
breach, pay damages, and recontract with an inviting third party.'
However, when people are involved, particularly children, paying
damages doesn't really compensate. One's affections are not and,
normatively speaking, should not be readily transferable.' More-
over, the idea of continually being on the lookoui for better family
"deals"--better spouses, children or parents-destroys family life.3"
Covenant, therefore, is preferable for describing families that
are well underway-for illuminating the relationship between hus-
band and wife or parent and child.3' Covenant implies a particular-
ly serious agreement that has characteristics of permanence and
unconditional love. The parties are bound not only to each other,
but with some third party (God or the state or both).2 But when
children reach adulthood and leave their parents, or when couples
divorce, 3 the law no longer binds them. What happens to the cove-
nant-the forever and unconditional part?
23, at 1573 (arguing for return of intimacy in legal family relationships); Carl E.
Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83
MICH. L. REv. 1803, 1832 (1985) (noting that family may act in ways unsusceptible
to continuing discourse).
28. Brinig, Status, Contract and Covenant, supra note 23, at 1586 & n.79.
29. In a way, this is like the difference between endorsing a check "pay Carl
Schneider" (nontransferable) as opposed to "pay to the order of Carl Schneider"
(transferable). In the first instance, only Carl gets the money. In the second, he may
delegate the money to whomever he wishes. Although after divorce you are free to
love another and begin a new life with someone else (a new hypothetical contract),
as anyone dealing with divorced or divorcing people knows, not only financial re-
sources but emotions are enmeshed.
30. Brinig, Status, Contract and Covenant, supra note 23, at 1601. I think of
this continuing search as "hedging."
31. See id. at 1574-76. For a lengthy discussion using the terminology of status
rather than covenant, see REGAN, supra note 16, 35-42. See also William J. Everett,
Contract and Covenant in Human Community, 36 EMORY L.J. 557, 565-68 (1987)
(discussing covenants between parents regarding parenthood). For discussions of part-
nership in the context of dissolution, see Bea A. Smith, The Partnership Theory of
Marriage. A Borrowed Solution Fails, 68 TEM L. REV. 689, 689-98 (1990), and
Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing with
Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Disassociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. Cm. L. REv.
67, 108-29 (1993).
32. See Brinig, Status, Contract and Covenant, supra note 23, at 1597-99.
33. When a married couple divorces, important vestiges still remain. These may
be ephemera, like photographs or ticket stubs. They may be remembrances as mo-
mentous as shared joys at children's triumphs or mutual sorrows at the death of a
family friend or beloved pet. The remains may include continued responsibilities for
co-parenting, the financial ties of joint business undertakings or responsibilities for
retiring long-term debts. I leave a fuller description for another day.
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Give not to son or wife, brother or friend, power over thee while thou
livest; and give not thy estate to another, lest thou repent, and en-
treat for the same.... In all thy works keep the pre-eminence....
In the time when thou shall end the days of thy life, and in the time
of thy decease, distribute thy inheritance.'
This paper describes in some detail the vestiges remaining
after the legal ties of infancy and parental responsibility disappear.
Some of the bonds between parent and adult child undoubtedly are
primordial and emotional and, therefore, unlikely to alter with
years and fortunes. Whether the siblings maintain that sort of rela-
tionship with each other on their own, or vis h vis their parents,
depends to some extent upon whether the parents are viewed as a
net good, in which case the "franchise model" operates. In the case
where the parents are seen as a net neutral or bad, a "state of na-
ture" governs.' Of at least passing interest to this conference, law
makes a critical difference in what is chosen-the franchise or the
largely unenforceable agreements of the state of nature. Law will
also certainly be involved where family governance of whatever sort
fails: there may be elder abuse, estate problems, suits to enforce
statutory duties of support, quarrels over competency, and the in-
creasingly popular disputes over grandparent visitation.
Although I have proposed two models for describing the behav-
ior of what might be described as mature families (or related
adults), the appropriate model depends in part upon the parent's
health, cheerfulness, and mental youthfulness. It will also hinge on
whether the parents estate is seen as large, small, or negative.
Thus, there may be a shift between paradigms as the parent ages or
his or her fortune changes. Siblings may act as franchisees during
their forties and their parents' late sixties, and then as sovereign
nations (perhaps warring ones) during their own late fifties and
their parents' eighties, as the parents become less pleasant to deal
with or the bond market crashes. On the other hand, the siblings
34. Sirach 33:30-24 (New American Bible).
35. The "state of nature" is Anthony Kronman's borrowing from THOMAS
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (C.B. Mac!herson ed., Penguin Books 1982) (1651). See Anthony
T. Kronman, Contract Law and the State of Nature, 1 J.L., ECON. & ORGANIZATION
5, 6 (1985).
The institution of franchise itself may be seen, from the perspective of fran-
chisees, as a tamer sort of sovereign nation model. Although other franchises may be
competitors (I have two Exxon stations and two 7-11 stores within six blocks of each
other on the commercial street nearest my home), their ivalry is more friendly than
that with competing brands. The commonness outweighs the competitive instinct. By
protecting the transactions with the franchisor, the law encourages referrals and
other sharing among the franchisees.
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may begin as "independent nations" and end up as franchisees if
their parents win the lottery or if being supportive otherwise be-
comes more attractive.
Moreover, the choice of models is skewed because, in some
respects, it is "natural" for adults to forget that they remain chil-
dren. From the parents' point of view there may still be hope of
enforcing the implicit contract made when the child was young-"I
will take care of you, love you, invest in you, and in return be cared
for by you when I am enfeebled."36 The adult child may act badly
because he or she has the opportunity for gaining what economists
call quasi rents" and because the big parental investment was all
made and the parent's love built in the child's youth, without his or
her explicit concurrence. 8 "I never agreed to have you live with
me, and I have a life of my own" may be the child's response to the
parent's incapacity. The adult child may therefore think of self and
siblings as individuals in isolation from each other and from their
parents.
Perhaps there is a distance that is the optimum distance for seeing
one's father, farther than across the supper table or across the room,
somewhere in the middle distance: he is dwarfed by trees or the
sweep of a hill, but his features are still visible, his body language
still distinct. Well, that is a distance I never found. He was never
dwarfed by the landscape--the fields, the buildings, the white pine
windbreak were as much my father as if he had grown them and
36. This implicit contract is the subject of Brinig, supra note 26, at 1. See also
JOHN LocE, of Parental Power, in SEcOND TREATISE ON GovERNMENT § 67 (Gate-
way 1964) (1690).
The subjection of a minor places in the father a temporary government,
which terminates with the minority of the child; and the honour due from a
child places in the parents a perpetual right to respect, reverence, support,
and compliance too, more or less, as the father's care, cost, and kindness in
his education has been more or less. This ends not with minority, but holds
in all parts and conditions of a man's life.
Id.
37. A quasi rent is income that is not earned, but extracted from the contract-
ing partner's "consumer surplus," the amount of satisfaction gained from the transac-
tion in excess of the price paid or opportunity foregone. For a discussion of quasi
rents in the context of marriage and divorce, see Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce and
Quasi Rents; Or, "I Gave Him the Best Years of My Life," 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 267,
287-303 (1987). The idea of quasi rents in this context is that the child may com-
fortably rely on the fact that the parent is extremely committed to him or her and
may therefore misbehave quite substantially or for a long time before the parent will
publicly complain.
38. As Richard Epstein noted, 'Democratic processes with universal sufferage
(sic] cannot register the preferences of the unborn, and dialogue between generations
is frustrated when future generations, or at least some future generations, are of
necessity silent." Justice Across the Generations, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1465, 1465 (1989).
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shed them like a husk.'
Both models of describing the mature family are, therefore,
worth considering, and we can influence which one dominates by
our choice of law.
1. ADULT CHILDREN AS SOVEREIGN NATIONS:
THE STATE OF NATURE
In commercial countries, where the authority of law is always per-
fectly sufficient to protect the meanest man in the state, the descen-
dants of the same family, having no such motive for keeping togeth-
er, naturally separate and disperse, -zs interest or inclination may
direct. They soon cease to be of importance to one another...
Students of human nature, at least since the time of John
Locke, have seen the obvious parallels between the associations of
adult children and their elderly parents and those of unrelated
citizens and communities.4 Locke, in his Second Treatise on Gov-
ernment, describes extended families residing together under the
father's guidance or "rule" through their own consent, that is,
through their new and voluntary contract.42 Without such an
agreement, the former infants are at liberty to govern themselves,
or to unite at will with other societies or communities. The rela-
tionship with their extended family is thus in many ways similar to
the relationship between sovereign nations.
If we consider the sovereign nation model as the political scien-
tist does, what do we see? Many of the problems between nations
depend upon whether their dealings can be characterized as reveal-
ing credibility and trust or miscalculation and betrayal." Groups
who have committed great crimes, like the Russians under Stalin,
are seen as being more difficult to bargain with, not only because
39. SMILE, supra note 1, at 20.
40. ADAAi SMITH, Of the Order in Which Individuals Are Recommended by Na-
ture to Our Care and Attention, in THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMTS, 359, 365
(Clarendon Press 1976) (1822).
41. For a most helpful discussion of enforcement in these circumstances, see
Kronman, supra note 35, at 24-30.
42. John Locke, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT, §§ 95-122 et seq. (Gateway
1964) (1690).
43. Id. § 119. Locke is setting up his argument for a popular government, as
opposed to Sir Robert Filmer's patriarchal monarchy. See id. §§ 90-91 & n.2, § 101
& nn.35-38.
44. For classic works, see ROBERT JERVIS, PERCEPTION AND MISPERCEPTION IN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, (1976), and Robert Jervis, Hypothesis on Misperception, in
THE WAR SYSTEm: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 465 (Richard A. Falk & Samuel
S. Kim eds., 1980).
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they are dangerous, but also because they are untrustworthy. The
choice of whether to trust depends at least to some extent upon
whether countries retell their joint histories in similar ways.45 Yet
even when they do, allies should never really be trusted, because
one's nation is not a "philanthropic" institution charged with ab-
sorbing the losses caused by another country's change of heart or
mind. Characterizing another regime as "evil" may cause the revi-
sion of history itself. Thus the Germans rewrote interpretations of
their prior dealings with the British during the military expansion
before World War II. And once a country takes a stand by revising
history, the protagonists believe in their new "truth" because it has
been stated so long that the speakers (or writers) begin to believe it.
The nation's credibility is therefore engaged with the winning argu-
ment as much as its allies. Further, when the debate reaches an
international audience, the exchange of views may itself destroy
truth, since the citizenry continues to hear its own governments
version. 6 In the gibne-theory terminology popular for describing
international negotiation," the equilibrium model becomes tit-for-
tat'or, as it is sometimes called, reciprocity.'
With the family, the paradigm developed so far would be al-
45. See, e.g., E.H. DANCE, HIsToRY THE BETRAYER 41-48 (1975) (noting typical
response when countries' histories conflict: "We like to think that we are right and
that our opponents are wrong... "); Stephen Van Evera, Hypotheses on National-
isn and War, 18 INT'L SECuRITY 5, 26 (1994) ("Nations can co-exist easily... when
they share a common image of their mutual history.").
46. This was undoubtedly part of Voice of America's mission and part of the
reason the end of the Cold War corresponded with the triumph of the Information
Age, when the tanks driving down Moscow's main streets were reported to the world
over the Internet even as they moved. Edward J. Valaushas, On the Nets and on the
Streets: A First-Person Report of the Soviet Coup, 16 ONLINE 41, 42 (1992).
47. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 1 (1960).
48. Tit-for-tat means that the subject nation's behavior will be contingent on
that of the other nation's, with an initial peaceful attitude. See, e.g., Thomas C.
Schelling, An Essay on Bargaining, 46 AM. ECON. REv. 281, 299-301 (1956) ("Each
party must be confident that the other will not jeopardize future opportunities by
destroying trust at the outset."). If the other nation behaves belligerently, so will the
subject nation. Reciprocity similarly involves the converse of a "golden rule" philos-
ophy; that is, do whatever the other participant has done to you. See, e.g., ROBERT
M. AXELROD, THE EvoLurioN OF COOPERATION 21 (1984) (discussing how WWI sol-
diers violated commands to achieve cooperation from the opposing side). For game-
theoretic discussions, see id. at 124-41 (discussing how to promote cooperation in
various systems); Brinig, Status, Contract and Covenant, supra note 23, at 1592 (dis-
cussing behavior-changing recognition of status in marriage); Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-opted or "The
Law of ADR," 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 36 (1991) (discussing settlement tactics
versus traditional adversarial legal tactics). For a readable general discussion of
game theory, including various solutions and strategies, see ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES
AND INFORMATION passim (1989).
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most pathological. Parents and siblings would attempt to look out
for their own interests rather than for the family's as a whole. They
would think in short- rather than long-range terms, and misunder-
standings and intolerance would abound, as they did in Smiley's
Thousand Acres. 9 Thankfully, this is not the prevalent pattern.
How does this unhappy situation, with its frequent escalation
and conflict, improve, if it ever does? In the ordinary contract with-
out enforceability, Thomas Hobbes sees a hopeless situation:
For he that performeth first, has no assurance the other will
performe after; because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle
mens ambition, avarice, anger, and other Passions, without the fear
of some coercive Power; which in the condition of meer Nature,
where all men are equall, and judges of the justnesse of their own
fears cannot possibly be supposed. And therefore he which
performeth first, does but betraye himselfe to his enemy; contrary
to the Right (he can never abandon) of defending his life, and
means of living.
Beginning with this quotation from Hobbes, Anthony Kronman has
written that informal mechanisms-hostage taking, collateral, un-
ion, and hands-tying-might be used to channel conduct51 in situa-
tions in which individuals and groups must "arrange their transac-
tions... without the aid of an independent enforcement mechanism
whose powers are significantly greater than their own."" Hostage
taking has attracted international attention not only when inmates
take prisoners, but also when international provocateurs, like those
in Lebanon or, more recently, Bosnia, detain innocent citizens of
another nation. The idea is that the other side will be willing to
deal, or at least refrain from attacking, if people (or goods) that they
value are held as negotiating devices."
49. See Sh=, supra note 1.
50. HOBBES, supra note 35, at 196.
51. For a more recent study of these extralegal sanctions, see David Charny,
Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REv. 373, 392-97
(1990). The classic article in this area is Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Rela-
tions in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 Am. Soc. REv. 55, 62-63 (1963). SMITH,
supra note 40, at 366, notes that among well-disposed people, the necessity or conve-
nience of mutual accommodation very frequently produces a friendship not unlike
that which takes place among those who are born to live in the same family.
Colleagues in office and partners in trade call each other brothers and fre-
quently feel towards one another as if they really were so. Their good agree-
ment is an advantage to all; and, if they are tolerably reasonable people,
they are naturally disposed to agree. We expect that they should do so, and
their disagreement is a sort of small scandal
52. Kronman, supra note 35, at 9.
53. Id. at 12-14. As Kronman explains, "Hostage-giving is, in fact, simply a
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Kronman defines collateral as something, held by one side (or a
third party) as a guarantee or pledge of performance by the other
(or both), that has value on the open market." In the international
setting, an example is the International Monetary Fund, in which
many nations invest. In the family, an instance of collateral is the
diamond engagement ring that bonds the affianced and belongs to
the nonbreaching party if the marriage promise is breached." Un-
ion is described by Kronman as the building of a shared affection 6
(or, as the political scientist would put it, a shared history). This
can be done with unrelated groups, such as nations, through em-
phasis on common characteristics, like Aryanism, or fear of another
nation, or through "cheerleading," like school songs or bumper stick-
ers. The most famous (and literal) example of hands-tying behav-
ior"7 is Ulysses's binding himself to the mast.' Economists exam-
means for achieving a simultaneity that would otherwise be unattainable; the hostage
acts as a bridge between two temporally distant moments of performance and brings
them into an artificial union with one another." Id. at 13. The power of the hostage
taker "can only be realized by means of threat and cajolery and therefore requires
our continued interaction following breach." Id. at 16.
54. Kronman, supra note 35, at 16.
I now hold something that is of value to me, because either it gives me
pleasure or it can be exchanged for something else that I want. To be sure,
the goblet is of value to you, too, but that is not what I care about. What
matters to me is that I now have an asset which is a direct substitute for
the performance you have promised, an asset whose value I can realize
through use or trade and (most important) without having to deal with you
at all ....
Id.
55. For a longer description of this custom, and the reasons for it, see Brinig,
Rings and Promises, supra note 22, at 204-13.
56. 'The parties to an exchange in the state of nature can therefore reduce the
risk of opportunism by taking steps to increase the likelihood that each will see his
own self-interest as being internally connected to the welfare of the other." Kronman,
supra note 35, at 20. Union "seeks to reduce divergence and competition by encour-
aging the parties to develop sympathy, affection, or love for one another." Id. at 2L
57. Kronman defined hands-tying behavior as "actions that make a promise
more credible by putting it out of the promisors power to breach without incurring
costs he could otherwise have avoided." Id. at 18. Kronman uses the example of
declaring one's commitment in a public place, in the presence of neighbors assembled
for the occasion. This substantially increases the harm that would be done to one's
reputation upon breach. Id. at 18-19 (citing Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The
Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615,
615-16. (1981)).
58. The myth is explored in psychological terms in JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND
THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 37-47 (1984). See also
Thomas C. Schelling, Enforcing Rules on Oneself, I J.L., ECON. & ORGANIZATION 357,
361 (1985) ("Acting in accordance with his current preferences for that future occa-
sion, he attempts to bind his behavior against those preferences that may be then
governing."). In the context of marriage, see Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational
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ine such hands-tying precommitments in situations where actors in-
vest in transaction-specific capital: for example, when a railroad
invests in a spur that can only lead to one mine and a mining com-
pany invests heavily in equipment useful only at one particular
site.69 Both parties' hands are tied so they cannot rationally act
uncooperatively.
This state-of-nature model helps explain family institutions like
reunions, Christmas giving to and by extended relatives, visiting
cousins when one is in town, and even the custom of retaining the
family name when one becomes an adult, all of which are "union-
building" devices. Retaining the family name made particular
sense-it was easy to recognize who was the landowner and who
was the blacksmith from one's surname. Therefore, family names
established one's reputation.'o We have weakened this kind of
identification in the modem concept of retaining maiden names or
adopting new surnames when we marry or have children."1 Hos-
tage taking is more difficult to see in the family context because it
presumes that the hostage is valued by one side but not the oth-
er,62 yet siblings usually value the same things.63 If the elderly
Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9, 38-93 (1990). A lit-
eral example is the Irish ballad of Johnny Sands (taught to me by my mother, who
learned it from her grandmother):
A man whose name was Johnny Sands / was wed to Betty Hayes. / He
thought with her in peace and quiet / to spend the rest of his days. I But
oh, she was a scolding wife, / full of caprice and whim; / He said that he
was tired of life, / and She was tired of him. / "Then I will go and drown
myself- / the river runs below." "Pray do, you silly elf, / I wished that long
ago." "For fear that I should courage lack, / and try to save my life, Pray
tie my hands behind my back." "I will, replied his wife." So down the hill
the loving wife / then came with all her force / to push him in; he stepped
aside / and she fell in of course. / Splashing, dashing like a fish I "Oh save
me, Johnny Sands!" / "I can't, my dear, though much I wish / For you have
tied my hands!"
59. Cf John Umbeck, A Theory of Contract Choice and the California Gold
Rush, 20 J.L. & EcoN. 421, 428-34 (1978) (recounting how gold-mining industry
avoided hands-tying behavior through cooperation among themselves). In the context
of trusts and estates, see, e.g., Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative
Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 51-54 (1992) (discussing options for limit-
ing effects of posthumous control through wills). For a description of specific invest-
ments by spouses, see Cohen, supra note 37, at 267-68. Specific investments cause
the damage to follow breach automatically, or nearly so. Kronman, supra note 35, at
19.
60. Yoram Ben-Porath, The F-Connection: Family, Friends, Firms and the Orga-
nization of Exchange, 6 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 1, 11 & n.6 (1980).
61. See, e.g., Lassiter-Geers v. Reichenbach, 492 A.2d 303, 306-07 (Md. 1985)
(holding that best interest of child was to assume father's surname); Stuart v. Board
of Supervisors, 295 A.2d 223, 224-27 (Md. 1972) (holding that election board could
not cancel a voter's registration because she used her maiden surname).
62. However, the "process of [spouses'] identification is consummated in the pro-
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parent has property the younger generation wants, the estate then
acts as collateral to induce the young to do what pleases the older
people.' Perhaps the absence of any such bond between adult sib-
lings is the reason these relationships tend to be weaker,' becom-
ing intensely competitive as the elderly parents near death. At the
same time the competition for the scarce parental resources grows,
other things that would bind the siblings together are fading.' The
memory of a childhood spent happily playing together may be faint,
especially in the reality of dealing with a cantankerous and sickly
senior.'
creation and rearing of children who. .. strengthen their parents' union, by giving
it an 'objective' or 'external' form." Kronman, supra note 35, at 21. Rearing children
can also be a form of mutual hostage taking. Id.
63. However, in my father's current will he has made specific devises to .me and
my brother that mean nothing to the devisee and a great deal to the other sibling.
This has encouraged us to remain good friends so that each can be sure of receiving
the valued property some years down the line.
64. See James M. Buchanan, Rent Seeking, Noncompensated Transfers, and Laws
of Succession, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 71, 74-79 (1983). Buchanan argues that this currying
of favor may not be what the elderly parent wants. Id. at 77. Another view is that
the parent wants good behavior to actually be spontaneous and any gift to be a gift,
not something earned.
65. For a fascinating modern study of a family at this stage, see SMILE, supra
note 1, at 305-30.
66. However, Ted Bergstrom, On the Evolution of Altruistic Ethical Rules for
Siblings 20-30 (1995) (unpublished working paper, University of Michigan, on file
with author), maintains that siblings still have incentives to cooperate because they
possess common genes.
67. Women more than men tend to care for elderly parents. See, e.g., Lee
Smith, What Do We Owe to the Elderly?, FORTUNE, Mar. 27, 1989, at 54, 58 ("Both
Christianity and Judaism make it plain that a child's responsibility to a parent is
fundamental, maybe even greater than his duty to his offspring .... Carrying out
the Fourth Commandment generally falls to middle-aged daughters and other female
relatives."); Nora Underwood, Mid-Life Panic, Thousands of Canadians Are Caught
Between Children and Elderly Parents, MACLEAN'S, Aug. 19, 1991, at 30, 32 ("You
have a situation now in which you have adults, particularly women, caring for their
children at a time when their own parents are likely to need help.") (quotation omit-
ted); see also Merril Silverstein, Stability and Change in Temporal Distance Between
the Elderly and Their Children, 32 DEMOGRAPHY 29, 34-43 (1995) (asserting gender
was positive but not significant factor in whether child would care for elderly par-
ent). Adult children have their own families competing for their attention at the
same time. See Herbert S. Donow, Am I My Father's Keeper? Sons as Caregivers, 31
GERONTOLOGIST 709, 709-10 (1991); Christine L. Himes, Future Caregivers: Projected
Family Structures of Older Persons, 47 J. GERONToLOGY 17, 24 (1992); Beverly
Horsbaugh, Redefining the Family: Recognizing the Altruistic Caregiver and the Im-
portance of Relational Needs, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 423, 470 (1992); Marshall B.
Kapp, Elder Law: Who's the Parent Here? The Family's Impact on the Autonomy of
Older Persons, 41 EMORY L.J. 773, 783-84 (1992).
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As the narrator, Ginny, reflects in A Thousand Acres:
Of course, fault had nothing to do with it, and I got over my jealou-
sy then by reminding myself over and over, with a kind of litany of
the central fact of my life-no day of my remembered life was with-
out Rose. Compared to our sisterhood, every other relationship was
marked by some sort of absence .... We've always known families
in Zebulon County that live together for years without speaking, for
whom a historic dispute over land or money burns so hot that it
engulfs every other subject, every other point of relationship or
affection. I didn't want that, I wanted that least of all, so I got over
my jealousy and made my relationship with Rose better than ev-
er.V
The siblings may now see in each other the traits they most disliked
in their parents, indecisiveness, greed, and intolerance," especially
if they are reminded of these characteristics by the elderly parents
themselves." In families without a great deal of wealth to pass on
or where the elderly person is senile, this model also may explain
certain types of hands-tying behavior: moving far away from the
family home so as not to have too many visits from the aged parent
or to avoid uncomfortable decisions like the question of moving the
parent to a nursing home.7 On the other extreme, the behavior
may be building the apartment addition that will only be useful for
the in-law to occupy.
68. SMILEY, supra note 1, at 8.
69. See SMILEY, supra note 1, at 6-13; see also supra note 6 (discussing char-
acter traits of daughters in A Thousand Acres).
70. See RIcHARD POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE 99-100 (1995). Posner quotes
T.S. Eliot, who writes in "East Coker," in Four Quartets: 'Do not let me hear / Of
the wisdom of old men, but rather of their folly, / Their fear of fear and frenzy,
their fear of possession, / Of belonging to another, or to others, or to God."
71. Cf Silverstein, supra note 67, at 35 (giving results of controlled-group study
where 31% of parents lived further from their children after a four-year span, but
attributing this to parents moving).
In Jane Smiley's A Thousand Acres, the youngest daughter, Caroline (the par-
allel to Shakespeare's Cordelia), moves away and gains distance from the family and'
the fanm. The distinction between the sisters is portrayed by Ginny, the middle
daughter, speaking of the family rituals of apologizing to their father:
For all her remarks and eye rolling, Rose could perform her part, and after
the fact, could even get our father to laugh about some things. Caroline,
though, was perennially innocent, or stubborn, or maybe just plain dumb
about this sort of thing. She was always looking for the rights and wrongs
of every argument, trying to figure out who should apologize for what, who
should go first, what the exact working of an apology should be.
SMILEY, supra note 1, at 3.
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Ill. FRANCHISE; THE TIES OF SHARED INVESTMENT
As I have now mentioned several times, there is an alternative
way of looking at the same relationships. At least some elements of
these extended families are like franchise arrangements: the older
person is the franchisor, with reputational stakes 2 as well as "up
front" investment in the middle-aged generation."3 The adult chil-
dren are franchisees, who have reaped the benefit of their parents'
educational and other investment in them, and who now actively
operate their own family units with the name, the reputation, and
possibly the fortune of their parents at risk. As Ginny's husband
observes, "Well, I think one of [your father's secrets] is that he's
afraid of his daughters." Ginny replies, "What has he got to fear?
He's got everyone on this place under his thumb." 4
The law-and-economics view of franchising is that it exists as
an alternative to company-owned businesses to save on the costs of
making repeat transactions. 5 The franchisor wishes to continue
72. In much of the game-theoretic literature, reputation serves as a discipline
among market participants, as the promisor attempts to develop and retain a name
for reliability. E.g., Charny, supra note 51, at 393; Klein & Leffler, supra note 57, at
615-16 (1981); Carl Shapiro, Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Rep-
utations, 98 Q.J. ECON. 659, 662-66 (1983); L.G. Telser, A Theory of Self-Enforcing
Agreements, 53 J. Bus. 27, 35-36 (1980).
Ben-Porath notes, "Authority, discipline, altruism, and family solidarity affect
the value of the signal, family affiliation, for the rest of the world. The presence of a
head of family, serving as director for communication, trust, and redistribution, re-
duces transaction costs within the family by reducing the need for bilateral relation-
ships." Ben-Porath, supra note 60, at 12.
73. See, e.g., Ben-Porath, supra note 60, at 3 ("Parental decisions to have chil-
dren and how to behave toward them in infancy and early childhood are unilateral
but are probably affected by expectations concerning future mutual relationships.").
Ben-Porath mentions that "large outstanding balances are tolerated," and "enforce-
ment is mostly internal." Id. at 4. The investments are specific because they are
"embedded in the identity of the partners, without which" they lose their meaning,
and "thus [are] specific and nonnegotiable or nontransferable." 1d.
74. SMUIL, supra note 1, at 103.
75. Transaction costs, as these are called, are the economist's equivalent of fric-
tion. They usually include the time expended in reaching agreement, attorney's fees,
and the paper and secretarial effort required to produce a contract. If the contract
requires legal enforcement later, all of these costs are greatly magnified and added
to court costs. The classic work on transaction costs is R.H. Coase, The Nature of the
Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). Emphasis on these frictions is one of the differences
between the "Chicago school" and the "new institutional" economists. See, e.g., OLIVER
WILLIAmsoN, THE EcoNoMIc INSTIrTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS AND RE-
LATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985); Richard N. Langlois, The New Institutional Economics:
An Introductory Essay, in ECONOMICS AS A PROCESS 1, 2-5 (Richard N. Langlois ed.,
1986) (outlining distinction between old and new institutionalism). For a complete
discussion in the context of franchising, see Gillian K Hadfield, Problematic Rela-
tions: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REV. 927,
FAMILY FRANCHISE
the firm's reputation for quality and price and therefore will allow
the franchisee the benefit of any firm innovations or trade secrets,
as well as the necessary tools and supplies (usually given at a sub-
stantial discount), and, most valuable, use of the firm name.76 In
return, the franchisee is supposed to keep the establishment in at
least the condition necessary to maintain the unsullied name of the
franchisor." To enforce such promises, franchises typically require
a series of determinate contracts that provide opportunities for
interim monitoring and specify the quality of goods sold as well as
inputs for the concern."8 Meanwhile, the franchisee usually is con-
cerned about opportunism by the franchisor, who may increase
input prices or impose additional costs upon the franchisee once the
contract term begins. 9
The family metaphor has not been lost on industry commenta-
tors who stress the human relationships involved in franchising:
'Being a franchisor is pretty much like being a parent. If there's a
squabble amongst the kids you try to get in there and solve it. You
have to handle it with diplomacy."" And, illustrating the inequali-
ty that is the hallmark of the franchise business relationship, "h]is
[the franchisee's] responsibility to you is to perform like you say
to81
965-70 (1990). Ben-Porath notes that "fi]nvestment in resources specific to a relation-
ship between identified parties can save transaction costs and stimulate trade" Ben-
Porath, supra note 60, at 1. He calls this investment "specialization by identity," and
notes that the "family is the locale of transactions in which identity dominates." I&.
76. Hadfield, supra note 75, at 931-32.
77. As Hadfield notes,
A franchisee is inclined to make decisions about how much effort to put into
the business based on the profits that will accrue directly to her in her own
outlet. She is not inclined to take into account that, because customers will
make judgments about the quality of the entire franchise system based on
their experience at an outlet, cost-saving reductions in quality at her outlet
will affect the overall value of the trademark and thus the profits of other
franchisees and the franchisor.
Id. at 949. Such free riding, Hadfield notes, is an example of the principal-agent
problem in the economics literature. Id. at 950; see also Robert S. Pyndyck & Daniel
L. Rubinfeld, MICROECONOMICS 617-36 (1989) (discussing agency relationships in
markets).
In casual observations on my infrequent trips to the hairdresser, hardly the
basis for an empirical work, the accomplishments of one's children seems to be the
most common topic of conversation between elderly patrons. Movies which also illus-
trate this point are STEEL MAGNOLIAS (Tri-Star 1989) and ON GOLDEN POND (Twenti-
eth Century Fox 1981).
78. Hadfield, supra note 75, at 931-38.
79. Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Com-
petitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L..& ECON. 297, 297-302 (1978).
80. HARRY KuRSCH, TnE FRANCHISE BOOit 119 (rev. ed., 1968).
81. JOHN J. HOOKER, TiE STORY OF MINNIE PEARL-A CASE HISTORY OF ONE
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When you sell the franchise, the franchisee is buying your
leadership. You are not buying his. The function of the franchisee
is to follow the wisdom and system of the franchisor .... [Tiell
him, 'Look, partner, we are both playing a role, and the role rve got
is the Daddy, and the role you've got is the son, and I'm going to
tell you how to do it. If you do it right we're doing to do it better.'"
Like the franchisor, the elderly parent has a large and specific
investment in the family name as well as in the children he or she
has raised.' The parent does not usually terminate the relation-
ship. Although there may be threats of disinheritance, these usually
will not be credible.' However, the parent may well prefer or even
insist on frequent monitoring. This serves two functions. First, the
parent may actually desire the contact with the child.85 In addition
to maternal or paternal affection, she or he may genuinely value the
child as a friend. The parent may also be lonely, and one's children
may be better company than are other elderly people, especially
when friends begin to die off. Finally (and this is related to the
franchise agreement), the parent may be monitoring the child's ac-
tivities to make sure that the family tradition, whatever it is, is
being carried on.8" Of course, keeping in touch with one's children
NEw CoMPAN'S TRIALS, TRIBULATIONS AND TRIMPHS IN FRANCHISING TODAY: RE-
PORT ON THE FIFTH INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE ON FRANCHISING 176
(C. Vaughn ed., 1970).
82. Id.
83. Ginny, the middle child in Smiley's retelling of King Lear, speaks of her
father as the "biggest farmer," framing "the right order of things." SMILEY, supra
note 1, at 20. 'Trying to understand him," she says, was like "listening to the minis-
ter marshal the evidence for God's goodness." Id. In the end, "the reality was incom-
prehensible, and furthermore the failure of our understandings was the greatest proof
of all, not of goodness or omniscience or whatever the subject of the day was, but of
power." Id.
84. The parent does not normally want to injure any of the children, but rather
to change the recalcitrants behavior. The most familiar example of such a parent is
the father in the parable of the Prodigal Son. Luke 15:11-32. However, the youngest
daughter is disinherited in both King Lear and A Thousand Acres. Smiley, supra
note 1, at 21.
85. For example, Marshall Kapp writes:
[Pleople live their lives embedded within various relationships, among which
the family for most of us is paramount. Since these relationships tend to
grow stronger over time, they take on added significance for most older per-
sons. These relationships have an empowering quality contributing to the
older person's potential for positive, affirmative autonomy to think and act,
as opposed to the simple, negative autonomy to be left alone.
Kapp, supra note 67, at 782.
86. Thus it was the older generation who wished to continue Old World lan-
guages, as in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-402 (1923), and in more modem
California and Quebec. It may be the elderly who move for extreme pluralism, as in
the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1934 (1994) (expressing strong pref-
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was simple in the era when many parents did not live long and
when those who did were likely to own the farm their children
worked or even the home the children lived inY As we have moved
away from our ancestral homes and off to faraway parts of the
country or world, we distance ourselves from our parents and make
monitoring more difficult. We are also less likely to support them,
given Social Security, Medicare, and pensions."
For the children (the franchisees), the relationships are com-
plex. Children sometimes vie not to support their parents. They
compete in rivalries about which grandchildren are most success-
ful, 9 whose job is the best, and who has best maintained family
traditions. Yet they still care about their brothers or sisters." And
they have a common interest in maintaining the family name and
perhaps in keeping the family property intact."' For example, in
erence for placing American-Indian children in need of homes with other American-
Indian families and through American-Indian courts), and the racial preference for
adoption statutes. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-102 (Michie Supp. 1995) (citing
factors for adopting racial-minority child); CAL. FAMILY CODE § 8709 (West Supp.
1995) (considering race as factor for child's best interests); MN. STAT. ANN. §
259.29 (West Supp. 1996) (requiring race consideration in adoption placements).
87. See SMILEY, supra note 1, at 266 ('The kind of life people lead in this coun-
try is getting rarer and rarer... Some of my best memories are of making hay
with my grandfather when my uncles were young men. They worked like one body,
they were that close.").
88. The corollary, of course, is that parents will not be as interested in support-
ing the children when they are young. As Ben-Porath explains, 'Mhe confidence of
each party in the degree to which he and his trading partners will go on being tied
together influences the amount of their investment commitment and the gains." Ben-
Porath, supra note 60, at 6. For a discussion of this reduction in investment, see
Brinig, infra note 124, at 302-12.
89. Note the jealousy of the elder son in the story of the Prodigal Son. The
elder son is angry at his younger brother for engaging in loose living and returning
to be rewarded. Meanwhile, the father has never acknowledged the elder son, who
has always followed his father's rules. The elder son is even more angry at his fa-
ther for what he sees as his father having ignored his own good traits while favoring
the younger, prodigal, brother. Luke 15:25-32.
90. Hence the phrase "blood is thicker than water." See Kronman, supra note
35, at 21-22 & nn12-13 (arguing that "solidarity of household community" eventmul-
ly replaces distrust inherent among siblings). But note that occasionally children vie
not to sacrifice for each other. Hale v. State, 408 A.2d 772, 773-74 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1979) (involving siblings who enlisted the state's help in their efforts to equalize
payments for their elderly and indigent parent); see, e.g., Pecinski v. Pecinski, 226
N.W.2d 180, 180-81 (Wis. 1975) (holding that siblings whose extenuating circum-
stances prevented them from donating kidney to dying sister could not make their
incompetent brother donate his kidney instead).
91. Economist Ted Bergstrom suggests another possible communality as well.
Bergstrom, supra note 66, at 22-23. In a combination of game theory and evolution-
ary biology, Bergstrom explains why siblings are apt to cooperate at least twice as
much as nonrelated people to assure at least half of their genes survive. Id
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King Lear, one of the Duke of Gloucester's sons is asked: "What are
you? / Your name, your quality, and why you answer / This present
summons?" Edgar repli6s, "Know my name is lost; / By treason's
tooth bare-guawn and canker-bit: / Yet am I noble as the adversary
/ I come to cope."92 This emphasis upon physical property would be
more apparent in rural communities, as it was during continental
feudalism.93 What may be more important now, as John Langbein
argues, is human capital.94 Our parents invested in our human
capital when we were young," and, as adults, we now have the
opportunity to profit from their investment. Whether we choose to
repay our parents for their investment will depend in part upon
nonfinancial considerations: love, guilt, and generalized emotional
intermeshings 5 It also will depend on coercive intervention
through state requirements such as legislation mandating support
of the elderly or prohibiting elder abuse.97 Finally, whether chil-
dren repay their parents will depend upon whether the unpleasant,
short-term burdens of caring for the older person outweigh the
92. WILLIAI SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR act 5, sc. 3, Ins. 120-124 (John D. Wil-
son ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1984).
93. See Ben-Porath, supra note 60, at 16
The supply of labor services by children is thus linked to the transfer-insur-
ance-bequests nexus. The particular form in which parents hold wealth (and
in which children accumulate their own) has implications for the demand of
parents and children for each other, and the particular choice of assets is
affected by returns that reflect both transactional and nontransactional con-
siderations.
Id.
94. John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth
Transmission, 86 MICH. L. REV. 722, 729-39 (1988).
95. David Hume, Of Polygamy and Divorces, in ESSAYS MORAl,, POLITICAL AND
LITERARY 181, (Eugene F. Miller ed., Liberty Classics 1987) (1777). In begetting chil-
dren, he is bound, by the ties of nature and humanity, to provide for their subsis-
tence and education. When he has performed these two parts of duty, no one can
reproach him with injustice or injury. See also the more ancient versiorn "What fa-
ther among you will give his son a snake if he asks for a fish, or hand him a scor-
pion if he asks for an egg? If you, with all your sins, know how to give your chil-
dren good things . .. ." Luke 11:12-13.
96. See Gary S. Becker, Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at Behav-
ior, 101 J. POL. ECON. 385, 392-401 (1993). The use of shame, guilt, and loss of self-
esteem in modern industrial society are the subjects of a number of articles. See J.
David Lewis & Andrew Weingert, Trust as a Social Reality, 63 Soc. FORCES 967,
968-74 (1985); Robert L. Sutton & Anita L. Callahan, The Stigma of Bankruptcy:
Spoiled Organizational Image and Its Management, 30 ACAD. MGMT. J. 405, 412-22
(1987). The use of these emotions is also the subject of nineteenth-century novels.
See, e.g., GEORGE ELIOT, MIDDLEMARCH (David Carroll ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1986)
(1871); WILLIAM D. HOWELLS, THE RISE OF SILAS LAPHAM (1912).
97. See, e.g., Stephen Crystal, Social Policy and Elder Abuse, in ELDER ABUSE:
CONFLICT IN THE FAMILY 331, 336-39 (Karl A- Pillemer & Rosalie S. Wolfe eds.,
1986) (criticizing various aspects of elder-abuse legislation).
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longer-term benefits, either in memory or inheritance.
The child may also be concerned that, like the franchisor, the
elderly parent may "up the ante" by requiring an increasingly oner-
ous performance. This could take the form of whining, complaints
about physical ailments, or demands for attention that point up the
competition among siblings. To some extent, the escalation is inevi-
table given the deteriorating health of the parent. 8 The franchi-
see-child then faces the problem, like the parent of an infant faced
with an onslaught of crying, of differentiating the parent's selfish
behavior from his or her genuine concerns.
Why are elderly parents more concerned with the long-range
benefit of the family's reputation than are their adult children?9
The answer lies in the concept of wasting assets.' If adults are
98. The English "poor laws," enacted in 1601, provided that relatives were to be
the primary source of support for the elderly, and community provision was to be
the last resort. David Thomson, 7 Am Not My Father's Keeper'. Families and the
Elderly in Nineteenth Century England, 2 L. & HIST. REV. 265, 266 (1984). This re-
mained the essential legal position in England until 1948. Id. William Blackstone
wrote that parents, because they care for infants, 'ought in return to be supported
by their offspring,' who owe them "honor and reverence' regardless of parents' mis-
behavior. Id. (quoting 1 WILAm BLACKSTONE, ComMENTARIES, *453). Thomson ar-
gues that these rules may have been "greatly circumscribed in reality." Id. at 268.
99. SMITH, supra note 40, at 359-60, notes that
[a man's] affections ... are by nature more strongly directed towards his
children than towards his parents, and his tenderness for the former seems
generally a more active principle than his reverence and gratitude towards
the latter ... Every thing may be expected, or at least hoped, from the
child. In ordinary cases, very little can be either expected or hoped from the
old man. The weakness of childhood interests the affections of the most bru-
tal and hard-hearted. It is only to the virtuous and humane that the infir-
mities of old age are not the objects of contempt and aversion.
This distinction in "moral sympathies" may be the basis for the different legal
treatment of obligations to parents and children. The former is statutory, limited to
the necessities of life, and does not bind the adult child's spouse. The latter comes
from the common law, is limited only by the parentfs station in life, and binds the
adult child's spouse as well. Compare LA. Cirv. CODE ANN. arts. 224 & 229 (West
1993 & Supp. 1995) (stating that parents' duty to children is limited by station in
life; children's duty to parents is limited by what is necessary) with Felisa L.D. v.
Allen M., 433 N.Y.S.2d 715, 717 (Faro. Ct. 1980) (ruling that wife's earnings were
property of marriage to which husband contributed by being a "house husband," and
therefore were available for payment of husband's legitimate child support obligation
from a previous marriage) and Hale v. State, 408 A.2d 772, 774 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1979) ("Betty Hale is unemployed. Indeed, so is her husband, who is, of course, not
responsible for the support of Mrs. Hale's parents.").
100. I thank my colbague Frank Buckley for this inspiration. Note that
"[a]lthough the young may be less selfish than the old when the cost of being self-
less is the same, the cost of voting selflessly may be higher for the young because
they have more to gain or lose from the governmental policies at issue in the elec-
tion, having a much longer period over which gains and losses can accrue to them."
POSNER, supra note 70, at 119.
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viewed as having two goals, lifetime consumption and preserving
"trademark capital," the first goal will predominate during most of
life. As there is less and less time to enjoy present consumption,
however, the importance of the second goal will increase until short-
ly before the adult's expected death. At that time, this goal will
occupy a preeminent position in the elderly person's preferences."'
Of course, elderly parents sometimes attempt to interfere with
their children's decisions by violating the terms of the unspoken
franchisee agreement that allows the child/franchise to operate
independently."2 In recent years, the courts have witnessed a
rash of grandparent visitation cases.' The decisions have rather
uniformly allowed visitation once divorce or death of an adult child
disrupts the family.' However, courts have not been as receptive
where the child's parents remain married,"5 nor when a new fain-
101. Preference trade-offs, or what economists call a person's utility function, are
shorthand for whatever makes a person happy given existing resources. It consists of
consumption items, leisure pursuits, and emotional and physical fulfillment.
102. Even in so-called "good families," the interaction of child with mother and
father, and husband with wife, can be intense, causing disappointment and pain. See
Rachel D. Cox, Marriae and the Family, in READINGS ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WOM-
EN 128, 129 (Judith M. Bardwick ed., 1972). Mothers and fathers often feel their
children's "rejection by peers," their abuse at "the hands of callous adults," their
"awkwardness" and "miscalculations," and their "misfortunes and failures keenly." Id.
There is the wounded pride and astonished unbelief when the bright prom-
ise of the toddler fades into the ordinariness of the school child.... In the
traditional family the young adult struggles to shake off the bonds of paren-
tal love that expresses itself in solicitude and supervision. ... And for the
parent whose child has made the necessary leap to freedom, there is the
pain of letting go, of turning back to the silent house, the untended bed, the
abandoned books, and baseball bats.
Id. Yet most families are characterized by love, and most parents are entrusted with
the care of their offspring without state or other interference. See Parham v. J.R.,
442 U.S. 584, 604 (1979).
103. In recent years, legislatures in all 50 states have enacted statutes giving
grandparents visitation rights. Ann M. Jackson, Comment, The Coming of Age of
Grandparent Visitation Rights, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 563, 564 & n.6 (1994); see also In
re Beckman v. Boggs, 655 A.2d 901, 905 (Md. Ct. App. 1995) (upholding paternal
grandparents' visitation rights after child's adoption by maternal grandparents); Adop-
tion of A.M.R., 527 N.W.2d 565, 566-68 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (refusing to terminate
maternal grandfather's preexisting visitation rights after child was adopted by custo-
dial father's new wife), review denied, 1995 Minn. LEXIS 351 (Minn. Apr. 18, 1995).
104. See, e.g., Beckman, 655 A.2d at 902; In re Nearhoof, 359 S.E.2d 587, 591
(W. Va. 1987) (holding that court-ordered grandparent visitation was "excessive"
where child's parents were still married).
105. See, e.g., Herndon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203, 209-10 (Mo. 1993) (en banc);
McIntyre v. McIntyre, 461 S.E.2d 745, 747-50 (N.C. 1995) (holding that grandparents
had no right to sue for visitation where no ongoing custody proceeding existed and
minor children's family was intact); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 579-82 (Tenn.
1993) (refusing to grant court-ordered grandparent visitation where child's parents
No. 2] FAMILY FRANCHISE
ily has been formed by adoption.' 6 For example, in the Tennessee
Supreme Court case of Hawk v. Hawk,"7 an elderly couple and
their adult son operated a bowling alley for many years before and
after the son's marriage."8 When the business relationship be-
tween the son and his parents began to deteriorate, so did the emo-
tional relationship between the two generations."° Eventually, the
parties became so estranged that the son and his wife refused to
allow the grandparents to visit their grandchildren."0 For consti-
tutional reasons, the Tennessee Supreme Court allowed the parents
the freedom to make this choice,"' at one point even characteriz-
ing the family as full of "entrenched animosity.""2 In an infamous,
recent example of another type of grandparent interference, Pamela
Bottoms successfully wrested custody of her grandson from her
daughter Sharon, a lesbian."'
Sometimes adult offspring welcome continued parental control
over their lives. For instance, in some divorce cases, parties have
protected their assets in large family holdings because those assets
were controlled by their parents."4 In other instances, where par-
were married and fit).
106. See, e.g., Acher v. Barnes, 236 S.E.2d 715, 716 (N.C. Ct. App.) (holding that
natural father's consent to child's adoption by stepfather terminated paternal
grandmother's visitation rights), cert. denied, 238 S.E.2d 149 (N.C. 1977). But see
Layton v. Foster, 460 N.E.2d 1351, 1352 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that natural father's
consent to stepfather's adoption of infant son did not terminate parental
grandparent's visitation rights). See generally Kathleen S. Bean, Grandparent Visita-
tion: Can the Parent Refuse?, 24 J. FAM. L. 393, 394 (1985-86) (examining state's
authority to order grandparent visitation); Edward M. Burns, Grandparent Visitation
Rights: Is It Time for the Pendulum to Fall?, 25 FAM. L.Q. 59, 61-72 (1991) (discuss-
ing grandparent visitation following adoption of grandchild); Samuel V. Schoonnaker
I et al., Constitutional Issues Raised by Third-Party Access to Children, 25 FAm.
L.Q. 95, 95-96 (1991) (examining constitutionality of Connecticut's broad grandparent
visitation statute); Peter A. Zablotsky, To Grandmother's House We Go: Grandparent
Visitation After Stepparent Adoption, 32 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 2-12 (1985) (discussing
conflict between grandparent visitation statutes and effect of adoption statutes); Ju-
dith L. Schandling, Note, The Constitutional Constraints on Grandparents' Visitation
Statutes, 86 COLmT. L. REV. 118, 125-37 (1986) (discussing constitutional ramifica-
tions of grandparent visitation).
107. 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1993).
108. Id. at 575.
109. Id. at 575-76.
110. Id. at 576.
11L. Id. at 582.
112. Id. at 576.
113. Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995). There were allegations of
unfitness by both sides. Sharon, the child's mother, had been unstable after her
marriage broke up, while the grandmother, until shortly before the action was
brought, maintained a long-term live-in relationship with a man who had allegedly
abused Sharon.
114. However, courts sometimes do not allow assets to be shielded. For example,
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ents seek to maintain control of their adult children's assets, par-
ents have established family firms eventually run by their chil-
dren."' And grandparents are frequently an early choice for
babysitters."
One answer to the problems for families presented by
Smiley" and Kronman,"' is to come to a consensus as to the
appropriate division of family property."9 James Buchanan pro-
in Stainback v. Stainback, 396 S.E.2d 686, 688 (Va. Ct. App. 1990), a husband's
father established a corporation to help the husband pursue a career in art. The
husband worked for the corporation by managing a storage facility and various farms
as well as producing art works. During a divorce proceeding, the husband's estranged
wife claimed that the corporation constituted part of the marital estate. In this case,
the corporate veil was "pierced" since "the entity was formed for the benefit of the
husband and his father, and the interests of ownership and management are inextri-
cably entwined." Id at 692. Thus, the wife was entitled to half of the corporate
assets as her share of the marital estate. Id. It is also possible that a court would
require assets to remain in family corporations to ensure that the assets ate avail-
able to pay future alimony. For example, in Watkins v. Watkins, 265 S.E.2d 750, 751
(Va. 1980), a husband owned a minority interest in the family corporations, valued
at approximately $1,500,000. Id. During the divorce, the husband tried to sell his
interest in the family corporations. The court, however, enjoined him from disposing
of the stock, finding that the husband's continued ability to pay support depended on
his continued ownership of the stock. Id. at 752.
115. One recent family feud, reported extensively in the Washington Post, con-
cerns the various holdings of Maryland's Haft family, including Dart Drug, Crown
Books, and Trak Automobile Parts. See, e.g., Saundra Torry, Haft v. Haft, One Fami-
ly Legal Bonanza, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 1994, at WB7 (reporting legal feuds of Haft
family in which father turned business over to son). Another example of litigation in
this area is Roanoke Engineering Sales Co. v. Rosenbaum, 290 S.E.2d 882 (Va.
1982). In that case, a father entered into business as a manufacturer's representative
in 1920, dealing in building supplies. Id. at 883. By 1962, the business had expanded
considerably, and all the stock was owned by the father's four sons, each of whom
served as an officer and director of the parent company. Id. Litigation ensued when
one of the sons, after a policy disagreement with his brothers, was discharged from
corporate office and relegated to employment as a salesman. Id. at 884. He resigned
as an employee and accepted employment for a direct competitor of the family com-
pany, violating a covenant not to compete. Id The Virginia Supreme Court ultimate-
ly upheld the covenant, enjoining the son from violating the contract for two-and-one-
half years. Id. at 884-87.
116. A letter to Ann Landers laments, "I took care of two [grandchildren] from
birth until they were a year old because their parents didn't want them in day care
until they could walk. I also took care of another grandson five days a week, 10
hours a day, because his mother couldn't afford day care. Thank goodness he just
started kindergarten." WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 1995, at C8.
117. See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text (discussing A Thousand Acres).
Remember also, in King Lear, there is bargaining between the daughters and their
father over how many servants he can bring along on his visits to them. WILIAM
SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR act II, sc. 4, Ins. 199-285 (John D. Wilson ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1984).
118. Kromnan, supra note 35, at 5.
119. Outside the family, game theorists have studied such behavior in a two-per-
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poses a rigidly defined succession rule such as primogeniture to pre-
vent rent seeking.uo If all family members understand from the
beginning that only one child can inherit and which child that is,
the cycling inherent in Kronman's contracts and the state of nature
will not occur." Parenthetically, this analysis is challenged by
hundreds of years of English history in which younger sons killed
their older siblings or sent them to fight in the Crusades, which
often amounted to the same thing."a
Modern America has emphatically rejected primogeniture and
has made it unprofitable to use violence to end the cycling
phenomenon.' Yet as I grow older, and my friends' parents die, I
hear more and more tales of families that have "fallen apart" when
an elderly parent passes away and the estate, or even the personal
property, has to be divided among the siblings.
How do we "fhx' this problem? In one sense, we have fixed it
already. Not "only have we abolished primogeniture and prohibited
property gains accomplished through murder, but we have also done
much as a society to ensure that there won't be too much in most
people's estates to squabble over. As we saw previously, most elder-
ly people live on their own.' Most of them support themselves
son game called 'The Ultimatum Game," in which one participant is given a sum of
money and can divide it (without conversation) with the other. The second partici-
pant has the option of accepting or rejecting the proffered amount. See Richard H.
Thaler, Anomalies: The Ultimatum Game, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1988, at 195, 195-96.
More recently, people have played the game in a series of studies. CATHERINE ECKEL
& PHILIP GROSSMAN, CHIVALRY AND SOLIDARITY IN ULTIIATUMl GAMES AND THE REL-
ATIVE PRICE OF FAIRNESS: GENDER DIFFERENCES IN A PuNISHMENT GAME (1994).
Women tend to expect less from the men who offer them shares in the initial endow-
ment, though on average they offer approximately the same amount.
120. Buchanan, supra note 64, at 78.
121. Buchanan maintains that the predictability of the rules for succession, rath-
er than any particular rule itself, are relevant for eliminating rent seeking. Id.
122. Examples of this phenomenon that come to mind include Shakespeare's
Richard III, as well as modem portrayals of the phenomenon in THE LION KING
(Walt Disney 1994) and Peter Sellers, THE WRONG Box (Columbia Tristar Home
Video 1966). The biblical story of Jacob and Esau also fits this pattern of sibling
rivalry, though with less violence. In this instance, the brothers' maneuvering for
their father's blessing is complicated by a form of "blaclnail" or "holdup. " This
blackmail occurs when Jacob insists that his father give him Esau's birthright in ex-
change for stew-a form of insurance. Genesis 25:28-34; see also Ben-Porath, supra
note 60, at 8 (stating that "the deal between Jacob and Esau is a reminder that
even within families there is no complete guarantee against such blackmail").
123. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-402 to -414, 64-1.18 (Michie 1995) (prevent-
ing people who slay family members from taking via intestacy); Sundin v. Klein, 269
S.E.2d 787, 791-92 (Va. 1980) (holding that husband may not take wife's share of
property they held as tenancy by the entireties after he murdered her), cert. denied
sub nom. Cross v. Sundin, 452 U.S. 911 (1981).
124. Margaret F. Brinig, Finite Horizons: The American Family, 2 INTIL J.
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through some combination of Social Security, Medicaid, pension
plans, and private savings. Today, the elderly live long enough to
use up most of the resources they have saved, and perhaps more,
leaving debts to nursing facilities and hospitals.' We have accom-
plished enough in medical technology to prolong the physical body
past the point where mental activity has reached a point of dimin-
ishing returns-even to the point where the patient may actively re-
sent his or her existence.
126
As the family lawyer in A Thousand Acres observes:
"In my experience, passing down the farm is always difficult. If
there aren't enough sons, then there are too many. Or the daugh-
ter-in-law isn't trustworthy. Wants to spend too much time having
fun. . "
Even though these aren't precisely the problems here, it's well
to remember that this transition is always difficult .... And that,
in most cases, once the transition has been made, and the older
generation is taken care of, things can go back to normal for twenty
years or so."
When there is no property" (as is the case with many elderly
women who have outlived their husbands and any resources put
aside for old age), the siblings may engage in a "hot potato" avoid-
ance game, which may hurt their elderly parent directly (particular-
CHILDREN'S RTS. 293, 304 (1994).
125. Life expectancy increased from 67 years in 1969 to 71.8 years in 1989. BU-
REAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNIT-
ED STATES 76 tbl. 104 (1992). These changes have come in part through eradication
of some diseases and advances in surgical technology. KEVIN KINSELLA & CYNTHIA
M. TAUBER, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, INTERNAT'L POPULATION REP. NO. P95192-3,
AN AGING WORLD I, at 23-30 (1993). For figures on the wealth, or lack of it, pos-
sessed by elderly Americans, see Karen C. Holder & Timothy M. Smeeding, The
Poor, the Rich, and the Insecure Elderly Caught in Between, 68 MILLBANK Q. 191,
200 (1990) (citing data regarding the excessive expense of the chronically ill). See
also Henry Cisneros, Health Policy for an Aging Population, 26 HOUSTON L. REV.
788-89 (1989) (same).
126. Posner reports that approximately 10% of the population in any given age
bracket says that they are not too happy. The portion of octogenarians stating that
they are very happy is about 30%, the same as for people between 30 and 39.
POSNER, supra note 70, at 110-11. However, I have heard my own parents' friends
talk of "doing a Kevorkian," and many have joined the Hemlock Society. Use of
Kevorkian's suicide machine was permanently enjoined in People v. Kevorkian, 534
N.W.2d 172, 175 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995). Id.
127. SMnEY, supra note 1, at 283.
128. Possession of property, as King Lear and A Thousand Acres show, provides
its own set of problems. Cf Ben-Porath, supra note 60, at 7 ("Even the most ex-
treme instances of seemingly unilateral giving-gifts and favors-are recognized as
forms of exchange. Often they are given in order to create an obligation .... The
tolerance of large outstanding balances signals the presence of trust or implicit
threats." (citation omitted)).
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ly their mother, since most victims of elder abuse are women), or
indirectly as she sees she is no longer valued or even wanted by the
children for whom she sacrificed so much.
In the commercial context, if the franchise has no value, the
franchisees may well breach the franchise agreement and start out
on their own, abandoning the franchise.' As a result, the franchi-
sor will withdraw from the business.'o With people, adjustment
for the failing franchise cannot be so simple. Familial rejection of
the elderly has always been a concern"' but not a common-law
concern. However, states have enacted laws requiring adult children
to provide for their "aged and necessitous" parents fairly recent-
ly,132 and still more recently have drafted legislation to deal with
the increasingly visible phenomenon of elder abuse. But is this type
of coercive legislation the best we can do?
To the extent that we have chosen public or self-support of the
elderly over the historical family protection, we have closed off a
vital link in the intergenerational structure of society. Gary Becker
makes this argument in his Nobel address:
129. See, eg., Land O'Lakes, Inc. v. Fredjos Enter., No. 88-C0716, 1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9224, at *2-4 (N.D. Ill. June 22, 1992) (noting that defendant repudi-
ated franchise agreement because of losses resulting from franchise relationship).
130. See, e.g., Picture Lake Campground, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, 497 F. Supp. 858,
860-61 (E.D. Va. 1980) (noting that franchisor decided to withdraw entirely from
business in which plaintiff/franchisee had invested). Where employers cannot monitor
the behavior of employees, the threat of termination (with loss of reputation and the
benefits of relationships formed at work) induces employees to work hard. See PAUL
C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORPLACE 70 & n43 (1990); James M. Malcomson,
Work Incentives, Hierarchy, and Internal Labor Markets, 92 J. POL. EcoN. 486,
486-87 (1984).
131; Note the triennial tithing relief for the widows and orphans in Deuteronomy
14:28-29.
132. Statutes in some states do require some minimal support from working chil-
dren if the aged and infirm parents would otherwise be on state support or in state
institutions. See ARi. CODE ANN. § 20-47-106 (Michie 1991); CAL. FAMILY CODE §
4400 (West 1994); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-2-9-1, -2 (Burns 1987 & Supp. 1995); MD.
CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 13-102 (1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-301 (1995); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 428.070 (lichie 1991); N.J.- STAT. ANN. § 44:1-140 (West 1993);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 1973 (1968 & Supp. 1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 25-
5-21, 25-7-27 to -28 (1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88 (Michie 1995); W. VA- CODE § 9-
5-9 (1990). See generally Alison P. Barnes & Lawrence A. Frolik, America the Aging,
16 FAM. ADvoc. 19, 22-23 (1993) (analyzing "worthiness" of elderly to receive social
benefits); Catherine D. Byrd, Relative Responsibility Extended:" Requirement of Adult
Children to Pay for Their Indigent Parents' Medical Needs, 22 FAM. L.Q. 98, 87
(1988) (same); Terrance A. Kline, A Rational Role for Filial Responsibility Laws in
Modern Society?, 26 Fat. L.Q. 195, 200 & n.47 (1992) (discussing current status of
laws requiring children to support their parents); Renae R. Patrick, Honor Thy Fa-
ther and Mother: Paying the Medical Bills of Elderly Parents, 19 U. Ricm. L. REV. 69
passim (1984) (same).
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[P]arents who do not need support when they become old do not try
as hard to make children more loyal or guiltier or otherwise feel as
well disposed toward their parents. This means that programs such
as social security that significantly help the elderly would encour-
age family members to drift apart emotionally, not by accident but
as maximizing responses to those policies.ln
Moreover, any abolition of pensions and other old-age benefits
may have an unfortunate effect that goes beyond hardship to a
current generation of elderly left without financial support."
Without cultural or community motivation, parents might still in-
vest little in their children but invest greater in their own human
capital.'35 The expectation under this alternative would be that
one must provide for one's own old age and prepare to live it in
isolation from one's kin-a lonely future indeed. In this time when
we rethink the federal budget and reorder various social welfare
programs, we need to remember these connections between the
generations and the importance of the family. We need to regain
some of the closeness of the famous Middletown adults, who not
only maintained regular contact with their parents, but also enjoyed
understanding, appreciation, obligation, and love between the gen-
erations."6 In fact, we need to invest in these relationships more
than ever since our lives will overlap with those of our parents to a
considerably greater extent today than in earlier generations. 
37
We would do well to remember the words expressed so long ago
in Adams v. Palmer: "
133. Becker, supra note 96, at 401; see also B. Douglas Bernheim et al., The
Strategic Bequest Motive, 93 J. POL ECON. 1045, 1074 (1985) (noting alleged general
decline in attentiveness of adult children to parents since introduction of Social Secu-
rity); Brinig, supra note 124, at 304-16 (demonstrating that change in provision for
elderly parents affects both positive and negative investments in minor children).
134. As Epstein has noted:
ITlhe natural parental investment in their children creates a bias for the
protection of their future that legal and social institutions should exploit,
not undermine. Taxing and regulatory policies designed to secure equality of
wealth in the next generation do so at the cost of reducing the levels of
capital accumulation ....
Epstein, supra note 38, at 1467 (1989). Epstein says the basis for the link is genetic
and that transmission is largely through bequests. Id. at 1472-75.
135. See Langbein, supra note 94, at 729-39.
136. See ROBERT S. LYND & HELEN M. LYND, MIDDLETOWN: A STUDY IN AMERI-
CAN CULTURE passim (1956) (studying community of Muncie, Indiana in 1929); see
also Kyriakos S. Markides et al., Sources of Helping and Intergenerational Solidarity:
A Three-Generation Study of Mexican Americans, 41 J. GERONTOLOGY 506 passim
(1986) (documenting high levels of involvement and affection between elderly parents
and their adult children in San Antonio's Mexican-American community).
137. See Peter Utlenberg, Death and the Family, 5 J. FAM. HIST. 313, 318-19
(1980).
138. 51 Me. 482, 483 (1863). This opinion discussed marriage, not the extended
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It is rather a social relation like that of parent and child, the obli-
gations of which arise not from the consent of concurring
minds-but are the creation of the law itself; a relation the most
important as affecting the happiness of individuals, the first step
from barbarism to incipient civilization, the purest tie of social life,
and the true basis of human progress.139
IV. FURTHER IMPLICATIONS OF THE FRANCHISE
As I mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the idea that
family relationships continue even after legal ties dissolve or be-
come less important is a notion with implications reaching beyond
the problems we have discussed here. The franchise model has
implications for children just "leaving the nest,"Uo for parties
adopting, and for divorcing couples, especially those with children.
The fact that the compacts we undertake in the family are not sim-
ple contracts with endpoints means that all family policy is critical-
ly important.
As I learn about families I become more and more convinced
that close involvement by divorced parents with their children en-
courages more responsive (and responsible) behavior on the part of
these parents.14' Conversely, a negative outcome results when di-
vorcing parents use their children to further competitive or vindic-
tive aims of their own.' This idea contradicts not only the writ-
ings of some feminists, who worry about the increased power joint
custody gives to divorcing men,' but also the important work of
family.
139. The view of the family as a building block of society, performing functions
other social institutions cannot perform, is well expressed by Lee E. Teitelbaum,
Placing the Family in Context, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 801, 812-22 (1989).
140. As one of my colleagues observed several years ago about his six grown
children, 'The umbilical cords at my house are rubber bands."
141. Mnookin, supra note 15, at 287-89.
142. In one relatively recent case, for example, a mother accused a father of
abusing their child and refused to produce the child for visitation. Morgan v.
Foretich, 546 A.2d 407, 408-10 (D.C. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1007 (1989). The
judge ruled that the evidence of abuse was inconclusive. The mother was found in
contempt for disobeying visitation orders and was incarcerated. For a literary exam-
ple, see HENRY JAMES, WHAT MAISIE KNEW (Douglas Jefferson & Douglas Grant eds.,
Oxford Press 1991) (1897) (telling story about child whose self-centered parents were
given alternating shared custody).
143. See, e.g., Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The Struggle for Paren-
tal Equality, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1415, 1442-51 (1991) (arguing that laws enforcing
visitation by noncustodial parent-usually the father-reinforce traditional family
roles); Carol Sanger, M Is for the Many Things, 1 RsV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 15,
24-26 (1992) (arguing that custody laws rightly favor women because they typically
do most daily parenting tasks); Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference,
and Child Custody, 80 CAT- L. REV. 615, 630-37 (1992) (arguing that custody should
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Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit,' T who suggest that one parent
should have control over visitation by the other (or anyone else) to
satisfy the child's need for stability. However, the idea that both
parents should stay closely involved with their children after di-
vorce also results in stability. I will mention just a couple of the
commentators who argue that continued involvement of fathers is
tremendously important. Using the analogy of the federal system
and the balance of powers, Ira Lupu posits that both parents are
needed to keep the treatment of children on a middle ground. 45
John Murray suggests that the custody regime chosen at divorce
ought to mirror as closely as possible the actual sharing of responsi-
bilities during the particular marriage.4
Covenantal (no "clean break") marriage may exist without the
tie of children, too, although probably only in marriages that last for
many years. 4 ' As a result, the "displaced homemaker" has proven
one of the most difficult problems for courts and scholars discussing
the role of alimony. Many times she (for at present it is almost
always a wife) married and raised children under a system in which
she was expected to invest in human capital that would aid her in
"household production," rather than entering the labor market.
replicate predivorce parental roles).
144. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHMD
37-39 (1973).
145. Ira C. Lupu, The Separation of Powers and the Protection of Children, 61 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1317, 1330-52 (1994).
146. John S. Murray, Improving Parent-Child Relationships Within the Divorced
Family: A Call for Legal Reform, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 563, 584-88 (1986); see also
PRINCIPLES OF MARITAL DISSOLUION §§ 2.02(1)(b), (c) (Am. Law Inst. Tentative Draft
(1996) (providing for involvement by both parents and replication of pre-divorce
parenting arrangements). In the end, the families may come to the kind of accom-
modation reached by couples in the films KRAmER V. KRAmER (Columbia Tristar
Home Video 1979) and MRS. DOUBTFIRE (Fox Home Entertainment 1993).
147. In In re Estate of Atherley, 119 Cal. Rptr. 41 (Ct. App. 1975), Harold left
Ruth, his wife of many years, to move in with Annette. Id. at 42. Late in life he
obtained an invalid Mexican divorce and then went through a marriage ceremony
with Annette. Id. at 43. After Harold and Annette's "marriage," they bought property
and made improvements to it. Id. Before his death, Harold saw Ruth again only be-
cause she felt sorry for him after he became sick. Id. at 45. Ruth never stopped
calling herself his wife, however, and was found to be his surviving spouse when he
died. Id. at 49.
In In re Soper's Estate, 264 N.W. 427 (Minn. 1935), a husband faked his own
suicide, left his wife of many years, and assumed a new identity and took a new
"wife" in Minnesota. Id. at 428. He told his new wife that his first wife had died. Id
After several years of being with this new mate, he actually did commit suicide. Id.
He left insurance naming his "wife" as beneficiary. Id. at 428-29. The court held
that the term "wife" could only mean the Minnesota woman. Id. at 432-33. It is
possible that he felt guilty about his first (and only real spouse) or, as the dissent
pointed out, that he worried about being found out. Id. at 433 (Olsen, J., dissenting).
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When no-fault divorce made it possible for her marriage to end
without her fault, she was left at divorce with few market skills, no
reasonable prospect of "rehabilitation," and a life in shambles.'
In many cases, the displaced homemaker is an obvious candi-
date for franchise because there were children who have now grown.
Income sharing,149 which is the likely remedy for such women up-
on divorce, ties husband and wife together unless she remarries, 5 '
clearly a franchise-like result. What is the franchise interest if there
never was a child (and therefore a pride and genetic connection, at
least)? It may well be that where people have lived together for
decades, they share so much life in common that the marriage it-
self-the memories, perhaps the career, as well as whatever has
been accumulated together-becomes the franchise."5 Women in
these types of marriages constitute the most troublesome category
for feminists .who want to discourage dependence. As a transitional
and humane matter, these dependent women must be protected. 2
The real question is whether so much investment (which necessarily
creates dependence) should be encouraged. Perhaps this is where
the two categories of marriage might separate upon divorce: a "lite"
version (without children and for a short time) and a "standard"
version (with children or for many years), with different divorce
rules1" and different compensation schemes envisioned for
each.1
5 4
148. Carl Schneider and I describe such a wife as "Mrs. Appleby" in our AN
INVITATION To FAMILY LAW: PRINCIPLES, PROCESS AND PERSPECTIVES 60 (1996).
149. For an early proposal suggesting income sharing tied to the length of the
marriage, see Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REV
1103, 1117-21 (1989).
150. Statistically, this is unlely; only 30% of divorced or widowed women over
40 remarry. Larry Bumpass et aL, Changing Patterns of Remarriage, 52 J. MARRIAGE
& FAA. 747, 753-54 (1990).
151. See supra note 33.
152. Even the strongest advocates of a nondependence model would allow this.
See Marsha Garrison, The Economics of Divorce: Changing Rules, Changing Results,
in DIVORCE REFORM AND THE CROSSROADS 75, 75-77 (Stephen D. Sugarman &
Herna H. Kay eds., 1990); Herma H. Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on
No.Fault Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56 U. CINN. L. REv. 1, 3 (1987); Vicki Schultz,
Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in
the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 1749, 1838-43 (1990).
153. To a limited extent, Virginia's divorce statute maintains such a difference,
requiring a couple to be separated for six months before divorce if they have no
children together and for one year before divorce if they do have children together.
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91(9)(a) (Michie 1995).
154. Other scholars have hinted at such an approach. See Jeffrey E. Stake, Man-
datory Planning for Divorce, 45 VAND. L. REV. 397, 447-51 (1992); Starnes, supra
note 31, at 119-38.
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The franchise regime also has important implications for the
parental ties that are created and severed through adoption. For ex-
ample, in her celebrated book, The Joy Luck Club, Amy Tan de-
scribes a mother who, fearing she will die, leaves infant twin daugh-
ters beside the road in the hope that they will be found and raised
in a better life.'55 She spends the rest of her life looking for them,
and it is only after her death that they are found."5 In a case-law
parallel, a Vietnamese woman places her children in a Saigon or-
phanage after a harrowing journey through the wartime central
highlands of Vietnam. 7 Both the woman and her children end up
in the United States. However, by the time the mother tracks her
children down, one of her sons has been placed for adoption in an
American home. 55
Someone who has acted in good faith will clearly be unhappy
with any outcome in a court case involving such children. When a
family has been disrupted by war, hardship, or death, need we cut
the ties as cleanly as we do in adoption? From the perspective of
mothers in dire circumstances, placement of a child can clearly be
the appropriate action at a given time.'59 Should the child then
know his heritage and how much the mother (or father) loved
him?160
The quest of birth parents and adopted children to find each
other defies easy characterization. 6' The law protects the birth
155. AMy TAN, THE JOY LUCK CLUB 25-26, 39-40 (1989).
156. ILd. at 39-40.
157. Doan Thi Huang Anh v. Nelson, 245 N.W.2d 511, 513 (Iowa 1976). Clearly
fathers are hurt by such circumstances as well. See Mary L. Shanely, Unwed
Fathers' Rights, Adoption, and Sex Equality: Gender-Neutrality and the Perpetuation
of Patriarchy, 95 COLUM. L. Rsv. 60, 66-77 (1995); cf. Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie
That Binds: The Constitutional Right of Children to Maintain Relationships with
Parent-Like Individuals, 53 MD. L. REv. 358, 390-99 (1994) (identifying needs and
rights of parent-like individuals).
158. Nelson, 245 N.W.2d at 513. In this case, the court returned the child to his
biological mother. Id. at 514.
159. Another familiar case comes from Exodus. Fearing that her son would be
drowned on Pharoah's order, Moses' mother places him in a basket where he is soon
found by Pharoah's daughter. Exodus 2:3-6. The mother, who has been watching
nearby, is recruited to nurse him. Id. at 7-9. Thus, like the Vietnamese woman,
Moses' mother is reunited with her son.
160. One of the issues in the contemporary film LOSING ISAIAH (Paramount 1995)
is the transracial question we discuss at some length in SCHNEIDER & BRINIG, supra
note 148, at 1074-95. The movie ends ambiguously with the possibility, however, of a
franchise-like solution. See also Zanita E. Fenton, In a World Not Their Own: The
Adoption of Black Children, 10 HARV. BLACKL-rrER J. 39, 63 (1993) (suggesting al-
ternatives to "traditional adoption," such as parenting by grandparents).
161. For a fairly recent fictional account of the process written for teenagers, see
LOIS LOWRY, FIND A STRANGER, SAY GOODBYE (1978). In this book, a 17-year-old girl,
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parents by hiding their identities from all who seek them,1" ex-
cept in some clear cases of emergency. This is what adoptive par-
ents want because the protection allows them to determine when, if
ever, their children should be told of their adoptive status. Increas-
ingly, states are responding to lobbying efforts on the part of both
birth parents and adoptive children by enacting statutes permitting
parents to leave identifying information with adoption agencies."
Although the provisions differ, the statutes usually allow adopted
children, at their option, to discover the birth parents' identity at
majority.
Does this appropriately satisfy the longing felt on both sides of
what seems to be a franchise?.. Or should we, as a society, move
toward a more open adoptive process as some are urging?"8 One
commentator has suggested that more open adoptions might pro-
duce a "middle ground" for cases in which fathers' rights have been
cut off without proper notice, allowing children to remain in their
current placement. 68 On the other side of the story, open adop-
tions might give more "market" power to birth parents, who seem to
have the upper hand in the struggle to adopt a healthy, white in-
ready to leave for college, is given permission by her adoptive parents to search for
her natural mother. Once she finds and speaks with her mother, she finds peace of
mind.
162. See, e.g., Alma Soo'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1234-37 (2d Cir.) (con-
cluding that requiring adoption records to be sealed does not violate Federal Consti-
tution), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979); see also In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751,
756-57. (11l.) (denying adult adoptee access to adoption records where no compelling
need was shown and because unsealing records could infringe on biological parents'
rights), appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 806 (1981). A moving article written by a birth
mother highlights the problems and suggests a paradigm switch in the way we con-
ceptualize the adoption process. Maureen A. Sweeney, Between Sorrow and Happy
Endings, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM, 329, 353-67 (1990).
163. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-751(c) (1995) (permitting birth parents to
make identifying information available to their children); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-3-4-26
to -28 (Burns Supp. 1995) (same); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-16(10) (Supp. 1995)
(same); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-126 to -236.01 (Michie 1995) (same).
164. For psychological evidence of this phenomenon, see Leverett Millen & Samu-
el Roll, Solomon's Mothers: A Special Case of Pathological Bereavement, 55 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 411, 412-17 (1985) and ARTHUR D. SoROsKY ET AL, THE ADOPTION
TRIANGLE, THE SEALED OR OPEN RECORDS: HOW THEY AFFECT ADOPTERS, BIRTH PAR-
ENTS, AND ADOPTIVE PARENTS 55-72 (1984). For an account of her own experience,
see Sweeney, supra note 162, at 329-33.
165. See, ag., Laurie A. Ames, Open Adoptions: Truth and Consequences, 16 L. &
PSYCH. REv. 137, 143-48 (1992); Nancy E. Dowd, A Feminist Analysis of Adoption,
107 HARV. L. REV. 913, 931-32 (1994) (reviewing ELIZABETH BARTHOIET, FAMILY
BONDs: ADOPTION AND THE POLITICS OF PARENTING (1993)); Holmes, supra note 157
at 380-81 (discussing need for reform in adoption statutes).
166. See Annette Haselhoff, Survey of New York Practice, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
169, 174 (1993).
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fant. My own view, consistent with the covenant and franchise
themes, is that, on balance, permitting continued contact between
parents and children (so long as the birth parents wish it) is a good
thing.
16 7
The fact that this paper presents two models for a variety of
problems-the sovereign-nation model and the franchise mod-
el-implies that we have some choice about which we prefer as a
society. The sovereign-nation model obviously promotes indepen-
dence and market-like behavior and carries with it the fragmenta-
tion characteristic of individualism carried to an extreme." As
should be obvious by this time, my personal choice, and the one I
believe better fits real families and family law, is the franchise.
Franchise also unifies us as a community-with our siblings, our
parents, and our children.'69
Have we as a society already made some choice? To the extent
that the sovereign-nation model dominates family relations today, it
is the product of several forces, some directly and others only indi-
rectly legal. The first force is no-fault divorce. When it became easi-
er for couples to separate and form new families, attachments to
spouses and children became in many ways more contingent. Par-
ticularly for men, who are said to view attachment to children in
terms of their current relationships, family life in many cases be-
comes discrete: rent-a-husband or rent-a-dad.1 ° The grand sweep
167. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-3-1-13 (Burns Supp. 1995) (identifying birth
parents' post-adoption visitation rights); cf In re Adoption of Francisco A., 866 P.2d
1175, 1178 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that trial court could allow foster mother
visitation with children she had sought to adopt but who were adopted by another
couple after foster mother's husband died).
168. The dangers of individualism in a family setting are explored by REGAN,
supra note 16, at 83-88.
169. Compare id. at 115 (noting that family discourse "makes available a 'middle
distance' that creates the possibility of a relational sense of self that is nonetheless
relatively stable"). with SMILEY, supra note 1, at 20 ("[T]here is a distance that is
the optimum distance for seeing one's father. .... ). The healthy family permits a
perspective of self from which each of us can grow to lead better lives.
170. No-fault divorce has had tremendous ripple effects upon the family. In the
first circle lie the obvious changes in support and custody. See Lynn D. Wardle, No-
Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 79, 112-19. Another
ripple affects marriage-both when couples decide to marry and what they do once
they are married. See Brinig & Crafton, supra note 22, at 883-92 (1994) (presenting
an empirical study of effects of no-fault divorce upon birth rates, marriage rates, and
spouse abuse); see also Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, The Price of Virtue,
PUBLIC CHOICE (forthcoming 1997) (manuscript at 8-14, on file with author) (assert-
ing that high divorce rate and no-fault legislation increase the percentage of illegiti-
mate births); Brinig, supra note 124, at 306-13 (asserting that divorce is positively
correlated with child abuse across states); Wardle, supra, at 171 & n.205 (asserting
that children of divorced parents are more likely to be juvenile delinquents).
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of family life disappears.
The next legal intervention is the whole set of laws that estab-
lished Social Security and Medicare and made private pensions
attractive for employers and workers. When we concentrate on
saving for our own old age (voluntarily or through taxation), we
spend less on our children and trust less in our continued relation-
ships with them.
A third legal change has been the lowering of the age of eman-
cipation to eighteen. What this does (besides the obvious political
changes of increasing the number of young voters) is to make col-
lege more the child's responsibility than the parents' (except in cer-
tain cases of divorce), and remove any force from parental guidance
about decisions like youthful marriage. We have a shorter time dur-
ing which our children are primarily our responsibility, and we have
less time within which we can learn from each other and strengthen
family bonds. Finally, perhaps in response to the social changes
that I argue have been inevitably wrought by all these legal choices,
we have enacted a spate of parental support and elder-abuse pre-
vention laws. These laws constrict the scope of family privacy and
protect against what used to be morally unthinkable-the abandon-
ment or mistreatment of our parents or children.
What legal choices do we have, now that Pandora's box is open?
Obviously, theoretically we can repeal some of the twentieth-centu-
ry laws that have so shaped the family and thus reapproach an idea
of franchise. But, like a "right to choose," we have gotten used to no-
fault divorce. Also, the over-sixty-five lobby (understandably, since
the safe harbor of family is no longer there) will probably prevent
any retrospective changes in Social Security or other transfer pro-
grams for the elderly. Our college-aged children are likewise going
to be hard-pressed to relinquish their Visa cards (though they might
relish the idea of giving up their student loans). Would the supply
of children for adoption increase or the demand by adoptive parents
decrease if adoption were made more open?
Less concretely but more legally, we can encourage investment
in our families. Joint-custody laws apparently motivate noncustodial
parents (most of them fathers) to continue to support their children.
A two-level divorce system, with divorce more difficult where there
are children, also encourages more committed families." An edu-
cation tax deduction, particularly for college educations, may also
encourage stronger ties. What about tax deductions for payments
171. For a discussion of such alternative divorce systems, see Elizabeth S. Scott,




made to support elderly parents? Or low-interest loan programs for
children who wish to build "in-law" additions to their homes? What
about reducing inheritance taxes so that elderly people won't feel
that they will lose a large part of what they have earned if they
don't consume it (or give it away) during life?
The presence of families enriches us most obviously, perhaps,
when we are helpless infants completely dependent upon adults, or
growing children flourishing under parental care and affection, or
loving spouses sharing common lives. To the extent that we stop
thinking about other members of our family as special people, we
become poor indeed, relative to other times and to other places.'
The nuclear family may be the central image, but what has hap-
pened to all the animating forces that surround it?
As a final thought, the system of family law I have proposed
here in some ways reflects a "difference" feminist approach.'73
Men, more than women, think binarily and in terms of absolutes:
right and wrong, victor and vanquished, self versus other.' To
these dualities, I would add married versus unmarried, child versus
adult, parent versus stranger. I maintain that family, and therefore
family law, is continuous, not discrete. One does not just turn a
family off and on like an electric switch. To the extent we have built
laws that deny the oceanic expanse and eternity of family life, we
create regret and hurt, moral malaise and longing. When we see
these negative emotions in large categories of people encountering
family laws, we need to be alert to a need for change. Some of our
current laws seem to encourage pathological behavior, such as elder
abuse, will contests, deadbeat attitudes, and surrogacy contests and
other ugly custody battles. Just as we can legislatively choose the
franchise solution, we can encourage more positive family outcomes.
172. This may be quantitatively as well as qualitatively true. See Brinig, supra
note 124, at 307-13, for an empirical analysis of the effect of connection with elderly
family members upon a variety of investments in "human capital," including in-
creased standardized test scores and decreased child abuse. The study tests the ef-
fects on a state cross-sectional and international basis. Id. at 307.
173. For writings by "difference" feminists, see, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIF-
FERENT VOICE 25-39 (1982) (analyzing differences in perception of boys and girls);
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's Law-
yering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 42 (1988) (concluding that legal profes-
sion fails to take differences between men and women into account).
174. See GILLIGAN, supra note 173, at 64-104; Trina Grillo, The Mediation Al-
ternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1547 (1991) (-The western
concept of law is based on a patriarchal paradigm characterized by hierarchy, linear
reasoning, the resolution of disputes through the application of abstract principles,
and the ideal of the reasonable person."); Kenneth L. Karst, Woman's Constitution,
1984 DuKE L.J. 447, 462 (stating that law relies on rights and adopts abstract hier-
archy of rules regulating interaction of individuals).
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